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How Gradualist are Chinese Reforms? Evidence from Rural Income 
Determinants 
Abstract 
Gradualist reform (GR) is a strategy that implements partial and incremental 
reforms at the beginning but gradually deepens the reforms over time. Using income 
determinants in rural China as the measure of the GR hypothesis, this paper provides a 
direct test of the widely accepted claim that China has followed a GR strategy. In the 
sense that reform deepens, production factors should become more important income 
determinants over time. Our difference-in-difference analysis, based on a large panel 
dataset from fixed-site rural surveys conducted between 1986 and 2002, shows that the 
efficiency of return to production factors deteriorated over time instead. Households 
that had more production resources, such as land and labor, or that devoted more labor 
and time to entrepreneurial activities experienced better income growth in the 1980s, 
but households with better political status did so in the 1990s. Further 
difference-in-difference analyses show that these income patterns are related to an 
inefficient credit allocation due to government interference in the 1990s comparing to 
market mechanisms in the 1980s.  Overall, the empirical evidence on the income 
determinants and the explanation through finance do not support the GR hypothesis on 
China’s reform path.   
  
JEL: G21, O18, Q14 
Keywords: Chinese reform, rural finance, income growth, gradualism, reversal 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most widely accepted interpretations of Chinese reforms is that China 
has followed a gradualist reform (GR) strategy. A GR strategy is characterized by two 
prominent features. One is incrementalism; that is, reforms first start in partial and 
incremental steps but over time they accelerate both in pace and in scope. The other is 
sequentialism; that is, reforms are launched in a sequential order such that early 
reforms reduce the costs of later reforms. China’s impressive GDP growth has led to a 
near consensus among economists that the GR strategy is superior to its closest 
intellectual and policy rival, the shock therapy adopted by post-socialist Eastern Europe 
and Russia. Wei (1997), for example, listed the following benefits of GR strategy: 
political feasibility, lower social costs, economizing policy makers’ cognitive 
capabilities, and optimizing the timing and sequential order of reforms.  
Our paper does not revisit these normative discussions on GR strategy. Instead, it 
asks a basic factual question: “Does a GR interpretation of Chinese reforms accurately 
characterize the pace and nature of Chinese economic reforms since 1978?” To make our 
exploration tractable, we focused on income growth patterns in rural China; 
specifically, whether income growth was consistent with a GR hypotheses. As the GR 
strategy suggests the development of more market-based mechanisms and the lessening 
of government control as reform deepens, it hypothesizes that income growth should be 
related more to production inputs (market-driven) than political relation (state control) 
over time.  
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Our data is based a large panel of fixed site rural surveys between 1986 and 2002, 
with gaps in year 1992-1994, covering 67,031 households. We include labor, land, 
entrepreneurial activities, credit access and political relationships in the income 
determinants to account for the fact that Chinese rural residents’ income derives mainly 
from four areas: labor income, land income, business income, and government transfer 
payments. We apply a difference-in-difference approach to explain various measures of 
income and income growth in rural households by the above-mentioned factors and a 
change in their deterministic effects over two periods: the 1980s and the 1990s.  
Four sets of empirical evidence emerge from the analyses. First, income growth is 
higher in the 1980s than in the 1990s. Second, production factors have a significant 
deterministic effect on income growth in the 1980s but much less in the 1990s. Third, 
households’ political status has no effect on income growth in the 1980s but a significant 
one in the 1990s. Finally, production factors losing deterministic effect on income is 
most evident for bank loans – our measure of capital credits as a production factor.  
Further analysis attributes the fourth income pattern to an inefficiency in credit 
allocation in the 1990s that favors on political status rather than economic performance. 
This evidence contradicts the GR hypothesis and suggests a reversal and deterioration 
of market mechanisms in playing the role of allocating resources and supporting 
income growth.   
Applying the GR strategy to the financial area, we would expect an advancement of 
financial development and market oriented capital allocation over time. Using the same 
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panel of fixed-site rural surveys, Qian and Huang (2016) detail how credit allocation 
became less market oriented in rural China from the 1980s to the 1990s. In the 1980s, 
credit allocation in rural areas largely followed market mechanisms supporting 
households to transit out of agriculture, while in the 1990s credits went to households 
endowed with favored political status. This paper shows that the deterioration in bank 
credit allocation efficiency is indeed related to the deterioration of market-based income 
determination from the 1980s to the 1990s. Although both papers examine the evolution 
of the market mechanism in the rural economy of China during the 1980s and the 1990s, 
this paper distinctly differs from Qian and Huang (2016) and is much more closely tied 
to the debates in the finance and growth literature. Whereas Qian and Huang (2016) 
focuses on deterioration of credit access credit access and, moreover, the causes of the 
financial reversal, this paper focuses on how income growth rewards production inputs 
and hence completes the circle by showing that the deterioration of credit allocation 
affects the real economy growth, specifically income growth and its determinants.   
In the development economic area, there is already an accumulated body of case 
evidence that GR strategy may not be an accurate characterization of Chinese reforms. 
Land reform is one of many examples. Chinese rural reforms started in 1978 with the 
granting of long-term contracting rights over state-owned land to farmers. A logical 
progression of contracting reforms is the privatization of land titles; a step the Chinese 
government has explicitly ruled out. A better example of GR strategy is Vietnam. 
Vietnam started out in 1986 with the exactly the same contracting reforms as China did 
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in 1978, but, unlike China, Vietnam also privatized land revenue rights in 1993. 
Institutional changes that aim to promote market mechanism are the key measures for 
the progress of economic reform (Lenger 2008) and China, unlike Vietnam, has fallen 
short of implementing the predicted changes in land ownership.   
Fiscal reform is another example. A well-known reform experiment involved 
delegating fiscal authority to local governments through a contractual arrangement 
between the central government and local governments. This initially modest step was 
heralded by economists as leading to broad institutional reforms—known as 
“federalism, Chinese style”—that supposedly would lead to a hardening of budget 
constraints and an evolution toward more fiscal accountability and transparency at the 
local level. There is one problem with this interpretation: the Chinese government 
moved to recentralize the fiscal system and reversed the reforms by eliminating the 
contracting arrangements in 1994, one year before the paper that coined the concept of 
“federalism, Chinese style” was published (Montinola, Qian and Weingast 1995). 
Previous research that challenges the GR interpretation of Chinese reforms is 
primarily qualitative in nature and based on case analytics (Huang 2008). Our paper 
offers a more systematic analysis and draws from a large-scale panel dataset based on 
fixed rural site surveys conducted annually between 1986 and 2002 (with a gap in 1992 
and 1994). Much of the research by economists, including research that led to the 
formulation of the GR strategy, is based on data available since the 1990s. To the best of 
our knowledge, this paper is among the first few to formulate an interpretation of 
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China’s reform strategy on the basis of long time-series data dating back to the 1980s 
rather than an assumption.  
We acknowledge at the outset that our findings are limited to income determinant 
patterns in rural China and, as such, our findings should not be mechanically 
extrapolated to other areas of Chinese economy (such as external trade and investment 
policies and privatization). That said, it should be noted that rural reforms played an 
important role in economists’ formulation of the GR strategy account of China. 
Naughton (1996) argued that the sequential order of first implementing rural reforms in 
the 1980s and following up with urban reforms in the 1990s is one of the defining 
features of Chinese reforms. However, since the main merit of reform is marketization, 
if evidence of intra-sectoral gradualism is absent, evidence of inter-sectoral gradualism 
is doubtful to exist and hence careful examination is required.  
In addition to the central role of rural reform in China’s economic development, 
another reason we focus on rural China is its economic importance. Even today, China’s 
rural population is sizable. By residence, rural population accounts for around 50% of 
the Chinese population, and by their legal registration status (the so-called hukou 
system) the rural share of population can be even higher. The a2015 survey of migrant 
workers by the National Bureau of Statistics of China revealed that there are 277 million 
rural migrants who work in cities but retained their rural legal status.1 During the 
1 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201604/t20160428_1349713.html 
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period of our survey data, that is, the 1980s and the 1990s, rural China was even more 
important than it is today.  
Rural China is a significant—although seldom acknowledged—factor behind many 
of the policy discussions on Chinese economy, although these topics are beyond the 
scope of our paper. This paper documents a reversal in the market-driven income 
determination mechanism and a significant slowdown of rural household income in the 
1990s. Because the rural share of China’s population is large, this slowdown had an 
immediate impact on its macro-economy. The slowdown of rural household income 
coincided with China’s falling consumption share of GDP and rising external balances; 
the two root causes behind global rebalancing and China’s exchange rate management. 
In addition to its relevance to financial reform and emerging market development, 
our paper is of particular interest to European countries and academics. According to 
Europe Union (EU) statistics2 (www.ec.europa.eu), China is the main location in Asia 
for EU’s outward investment, top 10 investors for EU’s inward foreign direct 
investments, and its second largest international trading partner. China’s economic 
reform and political or institutional system risk are therefore of great importance for EU 
economic stability and growth.  
As Cumming, Guariglia, Hou and Lee (2016) note, “China is attracting a surge of 
interest from academics around the world”. This surge includes European academics: 
the European Journal of Finance has published dozens of studies on Chinese capital 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Foreign_direct_investment_statistics 
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market in recent years which aim to understand China’s economic and financial 
development. Many of these studies closely relate to our theme of examining the 
economic and financial implications of a market-driven system versus a state-controlled 
system. For example, Guariglia and Mateut (2013, 2016) and Hsiang-Chun Michael Lin 
and Hong Bo (2012) closely examined how unfinished market reform, pervasive state 
ownership and political affiliation affects firms’ financing investment decisions. 
Huyghebaert and Wang (2016) expanded the analysis to a broader set of institutional 
developments, which capture legal and financial institution reform for marketization. 
Cumming, Guariglia, Hou and Lee (2014, 2016) noted that “characterizing Chinese 
firms cannot be well understood without considering the unique institutional 
environment” and that further work could examine the “history, evolution of financial 
intermediation, and detailed entrepreneurial finance in China”. Our paper, by 
analyzing the historical data of financing rural entrepreneurs and income growth 
exactly fills this gap.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
literature review of the GR strategy, finance and growth, and an explanation of 
empirical predictions and our empirical strategy. Section 3 describes the dataset and 
section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.   
2. Theory and methodology 
2.1 Literature review   
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Our paper relates to two strands of academic literature: transition economics, and 
finance and growth. Except for a few studies that primarily rely on qualitative data 
(e.g., bank and policy documents),3 economists and social scientists have long accepted 
the view that Chinese reforms have been gradualist and that the rapid growth of the 
Chinese economy is a result of GR strategy. The proponents of the GR strategy argue 
that market economy develops best not by revolution but by evolution. Such a strategy 
is justified on both economic and political grounds (e.g., Wei 1997; Roland 2000). 
Gradual or incremental reforms are believed to create political and economic 
complementarities. Politically, economic reforms can engender opposition from vested 
interest groups and from potential losers from reforms, which often derails first-best 
reforms. For example, while mass privatization can be justified on efficiency grounds, 
the political feasibility of this approach is often poor. For this reason, second-best 
reforms, such as those based on a GR logic, are viewed as superior. A GR strategy, by 
staging reforms and by making deeper reforms conditional on initial successes, 
minimizes the political and social costs of transition and incubates political support for 
further reform (Rodrik 2007).  
There is also an economic logic for a GR strategy. Reforms are best implemented 
endogenously rather than imposed exogenously. Endogenous reforms allow learning 
by doing and learning from experience and are less onerous on the cognitive 
3 This comment applies also to Huang’s studies (2008, 2012), which are based on document not statistical 
analysis. Qian and Huang (2016) provide statistical evidence on rural financial development, which does not 
fully support the GR view.  
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capabilities of policy makers. Endogenous reforms are also more self-reinforcing. For 
example, entry liberalization (as opposed to privatization), motivates state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to undertake reforms, because the entry of non-state firms reduces 
SOE profitability and forces the SOEs to reform. Naughton (1996) notes the 
“interconnectedness” of the institutional features of centrally planned economies which 
makes it possible for reforms to happen by “contagion.” “Unhooking a single key 
connection can cause the entire fabric to unravel” (Naughton 1996, p. 311).  One of the 
most famous examples illustrating gradualism’s economic logic is dual-track price 
reform: farmers can sell a portion of their produce at market price once their plan 
obligations are fulfilled. This alternative to full price liberalization is claimed to be 
effective because it is both simple and Pareto-optimal (Lau, Qian, and Roland 2000; 
Rodrik 2007).  
However, many of the studies, except a few historical narrative and factual accounts, 
explain Chinese economic success conditional upon China having adopted a gradualist 
strategy. In other words, China’s pursuit of a GR strategy is often assumed and asserted 
as an established fact. Few have actually explicitly and empirically examined the 
transition experience against data. Our paper takes no position on the normative 
aspects of the GR strategy. Instead we focus on a set of questions—to what extent does 
China’s reform reflect the predictions of a GR strategy about reform sequences and 
trajectories? Did market mechanisms actually deepen over time as predicted by GR 
logic? Is it true that market mechanisms expand over time endogenously? Specifically 
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for our empirical tests, did income become increasingly determined by production 
resources rather than the relationship with the state?   
Because access to bank credit is one of the most important income determinants, our 
paper is also closely related to a large body of literature on finance and economic 
growth and on the political economy of financial reversals. An extensive line of research 
shows that access to finance is critical for long-run economic growth (King and Levine 
1993, Levine 1997) and policy reversals that reduce financial access can impede growth 
(Rajan and Zingales 1998). As our paper shows, the deterioration of market mechanisms 
in determining income can be explained by the reversal of market allocation of bank 
credits. Our paper further emphasizes the detrimental effect of rural financial reversal 
as documented in Qian and Huang (2016). It should be noted that the financial reversal 
in rural China documented here is not unique to China, even though the contributory 
causes may be China-specific. Rajan and Zingales (2003) have identified a monumental 
development in the world’s financial history following World War II; namely, that 
many countries reversed their pre-war financial liberalization policies. This line of 
research was further developed by Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005). Interestingly, 
this line of research argues that the reversal was rooted in the previous financial 
liberalization: those who had benefited from initial financial liberalization subsequently 
sought to block further liberalization to protect their interests. . Our paper, while being 
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agnostic on the causes of the reversal,4 provides another example of the reversal and 
evidence of its real economic consequences.    
2.2 Empirical strategy  
The GR strategy perspective has a number of predictions amenable to empirical 
examination. Our focus is to understand how rural areas transit from a planned 
agriculture economy into a market-oriented economy by examining income 
determinant patterns—in particular, how production factors determine income 
growth—so as to shed light on the gradualism framework of Chinese reform. We do so 
by employing a difference-in-difference approach to examine the cross-sectional 
implications of income growth determinants.   
Suppose that, in each period, household income is determined by the time-varying 
production allocation: 
E [Yit|Xit, t]=αi + λt +Xit’βt,       (1) 
where Yit is the household i’s income growth in period t; αi is the household fixed effect; 
λt is the time varying effect; Xit is the household i’s devotion of production resources in 
4 There might be many economic reasons for the reversal. We however also believe that the rural economic reversal 
in China could have resulted from exogenous political shocks (Qian and Huang 2016), although empirically proving 
this assumption lies outside the immediate scope of this paper. Without doubt, the turning point was the 1989 
Tiananmen crackdown that brought a group of economic policy-makers into the national government, who differed 
fundamentally from those in power during the earlier decade. In the 1980s, the key economic policy-makers, Zhao 
Ziyang and Wan Li, rose to national prominence by using deregulation and reform – including the rural land 
contracting system – to turn around two of China’s largest rural economies, Sichuan and Anhui, respectively. In the 
1990s, however, China was ruled by two consummate technocrats, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, who built their 
political careers exclusively in the state sector.  Huang and Qian’s (2010) show that Shanghai had the smallest 
private entrepreneurship among China’s major cities. The archival research on bank documents shows that the 
reversal started in 1993 when Zhu Rongji became governor of China’s central bank.  
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period t; and βt measures  the production resources’ contribution to income growth. 
Under the null hypothesis of gradualism, βt should increase over time. That is,  
E [Yit+1|Xit+1, t]=αi + λt+1+Xit+1’βt+1 = αi + (λt +∆λt+1)+Xit+1’(βt+1 +∆βt+1 ),  (2) 
where ∆βt+1 should be positive for market-oriented production resources and negative 
for non–market-oriented production resources, if China’s reform experiences follow a 
GR formulation.  Similarly, for resource allocation such as private credit and 
determinants of credit allocation Xit, the null hypothesis based on the GR transition 
hypothesis suggests  ∆βt+1 to be positive for those household characteristics associated 
with improving  credit worthiness and negative for those household characteristics 
associated with deteriorating credit worthiness. The GR strategy, however, does not 
suggest any clear null prediction for ∆λt+1 
In summary, the primary regression equation in the empirical analysis is the 
following.  
Yit =αi + λt +Xit’βt +εit         (3) 
and 
Yit = αi + λt+ λoD+Xit’βo + Xit’βsD +εit       (4) 
where D equals one if t is in the latter half of the sample period (1995–2002). βt  
estimated from equation (3) for the two periods of the sample respectively and βs 
estimated from equation (4), a difference-in-difference measurement through 
cross-sectional implication, reveal how market mechanisms are at work in the two 
periods and have evolved over time.   
3 Data  
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3.1 The sample 
Our empirical investigation is primarily based on the most detailed dataset available 
for Chinese rural households: a fixed-site rural household survey (hereafter, FSRHS) 
conducted by China’s Ministry of Agriculture from 1986 to 2002 nationwide.5 The 
dataset is the same one used in Qian and Huang (2016). Nevertheless, for this paper to 
be self-illustrative, we describe here again in details how we verify and organize the 
dataset, although the procedure of data verification and organization is exactly the 
same as well. The FSRHS was not administered in 1992 and 1994 and it was 
discontinued after 2002 (or the data after 2002 is not made available). Our sample 
consists of two waves—annually from 1986 to 1991 and from 1995 to 2002, with a gap 
between 1991 and 1995. (Although the survey was administered in 1993, for analytical 
tractability we will report findings only for the 1986–1991 and 1995–2002 waves of the 
FSRHS.). In each year that it was administered, the survey sampled about 300 to 400 
villages, stratified by socioeconomic development level and geography, and most of 
these villages were resampled in subsequent years. Because about 20 to 120 households 
were selected randomly from each village, only about one-third of the households 
sampled each year were resampled in the next year.6  
5 In contrast, the China’s Household Income Project (CHIP)’s household surveys were administered only in 1988, 
1995 and 2002, and thus have significant gaps in their time series. Han, Wailes and Cramer (1995), Rozelle (1995), 
and Fang, Wailes and Gramer (1998) described and discussed in detail how this fixed-site rural household survey 
(FSRHS) data was collected, as well as the advantages and problems of using this data, including the data’s limited 
availability. Qian and Huang (2016) use this dataset to examine financial development in rural China.   
6 Although the survey clearly identifies resampled households, we further ensure resampling accuracy 
and consistency in the household identification codes over time by employing over a dozen demographic 
and land information variables and matching the year beginning and year end information. For analysis 
that involves variable changes over time at the household level, we limit the analysis to a subsample in 
which resampling is clearly established and the observations appear over at least four years in both 
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The survey questionnaires, at 35 plus pages, collect detailed accounts of financial 
transactions, income, expenditure flows, household assets, and employment 
information, age, gender, and education for household members. The questionnaires in 
the two waves and in 1993, although not identical, are similar, allowing most items to 
be constructed consistently. For this study, the most relevant information is household 
income, various economic inputs and other non-income factors that potentially 
influence income, such as labor, land, access to bank credits, and political status.   
The dataset used in this paper comprises household-level FSRHS data for six 
provinces—Liaoning, Shandong, Hubei, Guangdong, Yunnan, and Gansu—as they are 
the only ones whose data is released by the government. We have conducted checks to 
evaluate whether this FSRHS subset is representative of the country as a whole. First, 
there is no ex ante reason to expect that the reform took an opposite direction in these 
six provinces compared with the rest of the country. Second, a comparison of the 
average statistics across the country shows these six provinces to be above the national 
average in a number of economic indicators, including household income.7 Thus, all 
else being equal, our findings are conservative, because these six provinces are likely to 
be those where the deterioration of market mechanisms was less significant than the 
rest of the country.    
survey periods. This subsample includes 2,693 independent households and 35,125 household* year 
observations from the two surveys. The results reported in this paper use the full sample; we conduct 
robustness tests using the even panel subsample. The results are robust and the tables are available upon 
request. 
7 The households in these six provinces reported a higher level of income than the national sample; for 
example, an average of 2,791 yuan from our dataset compared with 2,442 yuan for the whole country in 
1986, and 12,223 yuan compared with 10,255 yuan for 1999. Thus, the six-province FSRHS covers richer 
households than the national FSRHS—and this is even more so in the 1990s than in the 1980s.  
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We control for potential data errors by performing a range of reconciliation checks 
using the 100 plus reconciliation equations listed in the FSRHS questionnaire appendix 
that specify relations among variables. We drop observations that failed to satisfy these 
reconciliation equations: 3.4% for the 1986–1991 wave and 8.8% for the 1995–2002 wave. 
The final sample includes 34,571 observations of household* year for the 1986–1991 
wave and 32,460 observations for the 1995–2002 wave.  
3.2 Variable definitions 
The variables used in the analysis are listed in the appendix. Income growth is 
measured for both the entire household and the portion of the income attributable to 
entrepreneurial activities. Income growth-household measures the growth rate of 
household net income (household total revenue minus consumption expenses and 
production costs); and income growth – non-farm measures the growth rate of the 
household’s net income from non-farm activities (revenue minus costs of non-farm 
production). We adopt the measure of income from non-farm activities in addition to 
household income for two reasons. First, it measures income from entrepreneurial 
transitions out of agriculture. Second, it provides a robust test of the production effect, 
because non-farm income is calculated independently of consumption whereas total net 
household income is partially driven by consumption. We also compute household 
income per unit of labor, the household net income divided by the number in of 
household members employed in the labor force, and estimate net income from non-farm 
per unit as net income from non-farm/total # of days spent on non-farm by all the members 
employed in the labor force. To provide a comparative overview for these two periods, 
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we also compute the annual average of income growth in each of the two waves. We 
adjust all these loan, income, and profit measures for inflation using a deflator based on 
the rural CPI in each province for each year, with the index values in 1985 (the constant) 
set to 100 for all provinces.  
We use loan access by the surveyed households, together with labor force and # of 
days spent on non-farm activities as the production factor, to establish the link between 
income growth determinants and resources allocation. The loan information includes 
two dummy variables—formal loan access and informal loan access—which equal one 
(zero otherwise) if the household secures any loans from banks and rural credit 
cooperatives (RCCs) or any other channels such as mutual credit cooperatives or 
individual providers of credit, respectively. Amount of formal (informal) loan is the 
amount of loans obtained from banks and RCCs (and other channels) in the surveyed 
year. Deflated loan amount is the loan amount deflated by the rural consumer price index 
(CPI) for each corresponding province, with year 1985 as the constant. 
As household income and credit access are both associated with the economic 
strength and resource endowment of the household, the explanatory variables used in 
this study overlap with some of those in Qian and Huang (2016), including 
demographic, economic, financial, and political factors. Because we are not able to 
directly observe loan interest rates, we estimate interest payment rate as the total interest 
payment divided by the total loan balance for the year. We include cultivated land (the 
size of the land worked by the household at the beginning of the year) and labor force 
(the total number of household members in the work force) as controls, because the 
18 
 
microfinance literature identifies them as important determinants of household income 
and credit access (Chen and Chivakul 2008, Crook and Hochguertel 2005, and Duca and 
Rosenthal 1993). Our intuition is that a household’s land and labor resources affect their 
production inputs and qualification for access to loans. We measure collateral as the 
number of durable goods a household owns, with the number of cars and motorcycles 
rescaled by 100 and 10, respectively, to be comparable with such goods as TV sets and 
washing machines. On the demand side, we measure fixed assets investment—the 
household’s investment that year in fixed assets for production purposes—as demand. 
For alternative financing sources, we include net household income, measured by total 
household income minus all household expenses; other financial assets, including the 
amount of cash, deposits, treasury and private investment, and claims on individual 
lending; and remittance, the amount the household received as gifts from non-local 
relatives. 
We also use fixed effects on year, province, agriculture, subsidized family, and 
agricultural specialty to control for time and geographic differences, as well as possible 
sectoral lending priorities or bank obligations. We denote agriculture as the household’s 
“core production” if survey respondents selected planting, forestry, husbandry, or 
fishing (with the remaining choices being industry, construction, transportation, and 
service) and if the family has an agricultural specialty in any large-scale area of 
agriculture. We base education level on that of the leading family member in the labor 
force. Subsidized family indicates that the household is subsidized by the government 
because of special hardship. Finally, we test for the existence of political preference 
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using political status, a dummy variable equal to one (zero otherwise) if a family 
member is a Communist Party member, military veteran, employee of a state-owned 
firm, or local government official.  
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
As we use the same dataset as Qian and Huang (2016), Table 1 describing the 
sample coverage is therefore the same. The 1986–1991 survey data for the six provinces 
covers 66 villages and 34,571 household * year; the data for the 1995–2002 wave 
includes 79 villages and 32,460 household* year. Table 1 shows that the sample 
distribution of households over the years is quite even: 200 to 2,000 households are 
sampled for each village. Because villages in Yunan and Gansu tend to be smaller, so is 
the number of sampled households in the survey. For every province, the average 
number of households in each village is stable over time, except for Liaoning in the first 
two years; 1986 and 1987.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 summarizes our primary demographic, income and production inputs. The 
average number of members in each household remains between four and five, 
although the numbers are relatively smaller during the 1995–2002 period, most 
probably because of the implementation of the one-child policy. In addition, and 
possibly as a result of financial reversal, the growth rate of household income slows 
down dramatically during the 1995–2002 period compared with the 1986–1991 period. 
Moreover, although both the total and per capita net household incomes more than 
triples over this time on average, a year-by-year check of the numbers shows that 
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almost all of the growth is achieved before 1995. The net household income and per 
capita income, respectively, grow at 11.8% and 12.2% annually during the 1986–1991 
period but double between 1992 and 1995. During the 1995–2002 period, however, they 
fall to 3.8% and 5.1%, respectively. The gap between the minimum and maximum 
household incomes also widens during the second survey period. In fact, the time series 
trend of income, although not reported in Table 2,8 reveals that income growth is much 
steadier in the 1986–1991 period than in the 1995–2002 period.  
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
4 Empirical results  
4.1 Income growth pattern 
Figure 1 shows annual average (mean of the sample) household income using 
deflated income measures to exclude inflation effect, presenting a clear picture of 
income growth over time. We first compute the year-to-year growth rate of these 
income measures for each household, then compute the sample average for each year. 
As Figure 1 shows, all four measures of income growth—net household income, per labor 
net income (net household income/number of household labor force), net income from 
non-farm activities, and per unit (labor*day) income from non-farm activities—, are higher in 
the 1980s than in the 1990s. The differences are especially striking for income from non-
farm activities, in terms of both net total income and per labor-day unit income.     
To show the economic and statistical magnitude of the differences between these 
two periods, in Table 3 we compare household income growth rates in the 1986–1991 
8 These statistics are available from the authors upon request. 
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period with those in the 1995–2002 period. Here we include both nominal and deflated 
measures and compare the pooled average in both mean and median. Panel A shows 
the means of the income growth rate for the full sample and subsample, as well as t-test 
results for subsample mean differences. Panel B lists the median income growth rates 
for the full sample and subsample, together with Wilcoxon test results for subsample 
median differences. As Table 3 shows, 14 out of the 16 measures of income growth rate 
are lower in the second survey period, with t-values (differences in subsample means) 
or Wilcoxon statistics (differences in subsample medians) mostly significant at the 1% 
level. 
    [Insert table 3 here] 
As discussed in the methodology section, gradualism does not predict a clear 
direction for Yit itself or coefficient ∆λt+1; the decrease in income per se therefore does 
not shed light on whether the GR hypothesis holds. Moreover, many economic reasons 
may have contributed to these income growth patterns. We will perform a number of 
tests on ∆βt+1 in order to identify the effect of market mechanisms, or lack of them, from 
the time series of development stage.  
Without excluding other potential causes, we focus on establishing the link between 
income growth and the return to production factors and inefficiency in allocating 
resources. To start with, we conduct simple univariate cross-sectional tests. In Table 4, 
we compare household income growth by regime and across groups based on 
households’ demographics, resource endowments, entrepreneurship inputs, and 
government relationships. We conduct the difference test between high and low groups 
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in each time period, 1986-1991 and 1995-2005; the difference test between the two time 
periods for each group, high or low; and the difference-in-difference test. Table 4 shows 
four clear patterns. First, groups with high values in economic determinants always 
have a higher income growth rate than the groups with low values in economic 
determinants. Second, for all groups, income growth rate is higher in the 1980s than in 
the 1990s. Third, for the economic determinants—land, labor and days on non-farm 
activities—high-value groups outperform the low value groups more in the 1980s than 
in the 1990s. Finally, for the non-economic determinants—political status and 
agriculture specialty—the low-value groups underperform the high value groups much 
less in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Overall, the univariate comparison and DD tests in 
Table 4 suggest that the economic determinants contributed much more to income 
growth in the 1980s and that their contribution declined over time. In contrast, 
government relationship contributed little to income growth in the 1980s but their 
contribution increased over time.     
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.2 Returns to production factors 
To better understand how income growth patterns are shaped, we analyze the 
determinants of income growth in the two periods using equation (1) and test the 
difference-in-difference using equation (2). In Table 5, the observations include those in 
the 1986–1991 survey. The dependent variables are the growth rate of net household 
income and household income from non-farm activities, measured in both nominal and 
deflated terms at the household, per labor and day unit levels. The independent 
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variables include access to finance (bank/RCC loan and informal loan access), 
entrepreneurship (portion of year spent on non-farm activities), household inputs (land, 
household labor forces), household characteristics (education, subsidized family, agricultural 
specialty), and the non-economic factor, political status. The regressions also control for 
year and region fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by household. 
Consistent with the univariate tests reported in Table 4, bank/RCC loans during 1986-
1991 are significantly positively associated with household income growth and per labor or 
unit income growth. All else equal, during this period, access to bank/RCC credit is 
associated with higher household income (deflated) by 5.84% (3.87%), significant at the 
1% level. Entrepreneurial effort also pays off: a household that expends one entire 
year’s labor on non-farm activities has a 2.2% to 12.22% higher income growth rate than 
a household that expends no labor on non-farm activities. This relation is positively 
significant for seven out of eight growth measures. Fixed investment is also important in 
improving household income: for each (log) RMB of investment, the income growth 
rate increases from 1.49%~5.23%, significant at the 1% level for all eight growth 
measures. On the other hand, political status is negatively associated with income 
growth. This suggests that, during the 1980s, political activities diverted energy from 
production activities. Taken together, these findings suggest that households in the 
1980s were able to transit out of agriculture through entrepreneurship, owning 
resources, and access to finance. Furthermore, political status was not an economic 
asset. It in fact led to an income decrease.    
[Insert table 5 about here] 
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Table 6 reports the results of a similar income analysis for the second survey period, 
which yields very different outcomes from the ones for the first survey period. First, 
bank/RCC loans in the 1995–2002 wave no longer support household income growth as they 
did in the 1986–1991 wave. Second, entrepreneurial efforts no longer pay off and are 
sometimes even significantly negative; for example, when the per unit net income from 
non-farm activities are the dependent variable. Even fixed investment is no longer effective 
in improving income growth. The only persistently positive and significant factor now 
is agricultural specialty. These results suggest that households wanting to transit out of 
agriculture in the 1990s were no longer supported.  
    [Insert table 6 here] 
In Table 7, we test whether the difference between the two survey periods is 
significant. To capture the structural shift, the specification incorporates a dummy 
(second regime) that equals 1 if the year falls between 1995 and 2002, and its interaction 
terms with all the stand-alone explanatory variables. Even after controlling for the 
structural shift, we find a significant drop in income growth in the 1990s ranging from -
5.34% to -94.91%, which is significant for three out of the eight measures. The role of 
entrepreneurship (indicated by non-farm activities) in supporting income growth is 
significantly different between the second and first survey periods, being large and 
negative at between -1.18% and -2.71% in the second period. On the other hand, 
farming produces a significantly positive difference.  
[Insert table 7 about here] 
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In the cross-sectional analysis, bank loan access is only significant for household income 
in the first period, resulting in a significant change in the coefficient on bank or RCC 
credit access from one period to the other. The latter result is consistent with our 
conjecture that the reduction of bank credits contribute to the reduction in the household 
income growth rate in the second period.   
4.3 Explanations for income pattern 
In this subsection, we explore the possible reasons behind the deterioration of the 
relation between household income growth and resource endowments and production 
inputs. Because we do not directly observe market or state-controlled prices of the 
resources and inputs faced by these households, we have to rely on the variables that 
are covered in the survey data, such as credit access and interest payment to explore the 
role and effects of changes in financial allocation.   
Using a difference-in-difference estimation with specifications similar to equation (4) 
in this paper, Qian and Huang (2016) examine formal credits extended by the banks and 
RCCs and informal credits obtained through other channels (e.g., family, relatives, and 
mutual assistance associations) in the 1980s and the 1990s. The credits are measured in 
terms of access, loan amount, and deflated loan amount. The explanatory variables are 
microfinancing factors (land, household labor forces); entrepreneurial activities (portion of 
year spent on non-farm activities); loan demands (fixed assets investments, household 
income); pricing factors (interest, collateral); alternative sources (informal loans, financial 
assets, remittance); household characteristics (education, subsidized family, agricultural 
specialty); and finally, political status. The regression also controls for year and region 
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fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the household level. A dummy 
variable for the second survey period and its interactive terms with all the stand-alone 
variables are included too.  
Qian and Huang (2016) find that not only is there a large decrease in loan access and 
loan amounts during the second period, but the importance of production resources, 
such as land, labor and entrepreneurship (measured by the portion of a year devoted to 
non-farm activities), decreases significantly (at the 1% level) in explaining the variances 
of credit access . In contrast, the importance of political status and collateral increases, 
also at a 1% significant level.   
We also run credit access determinants analysis for the two periods separately. The 
tables are not reported here but available upon request. They are consistent with the 
findings generated from the pooled regressions. The single-period regressions show 
that, during the 1986–1991 period, the allocation of bank/RCC credits is positively 
associated with household entrepreneurial activities and always significant at the 1% 
level. In particular, the bank/RCC credits go to households endowed with production 
resources, such as cultivated land and labor force. Consistent with a hypothesis 
emphasizing the role of market forces, formal credits are also higher for households that 
have larger demand (fixed investments) and pay higher interest rates. During this period, 
collateral is not mandatory in the allocation decision, and consistent with the pecking 
order theory of capital structure, formal credits are lower in households with more 
alternative financing resources, such as informal credits, financial assets, and remittances 
received. Households with better political status are not privileged in receiving loans. 
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Overall, the bank/RCC loan allocation decisions in this period are consistent with 
market economy principles; that is, to support household transition out of agriculture 
uninfluenced by political factors.  
There may be many demand and supply side reasons for this income growth 
pattern. For example, changing features of economic development may have affected 
investment opportunities. Labor migration rose in the 1990s which could have affected 
the quality of labor supply in rural China. Education and ability may explain the 
observed effect of political status. Our analysis does not attempt to pin down or exclude 
any of these explanations. 
We note that, although the deterioration of rural income determinants by market 
mechanism is consistent with a substantial worsening of income equality in the 1990s, 
China maintained a strong GDP growth. We do not rule out the possibility that reforms 
in other areas, such as foreign investment and trade, might have played an offsetting 
effect against the rural income deterioration. The goal of this paper is not to provide an 
overall assessment of Chinese reforms but to identify a hitherto little-noted important 
development in rural China and use this development to re-evaluate the claim on the 
GR strategy. The overall empirical evidence on income determination shows no 
improvement in market mechanisms but rather deterioration over time, which 
contradicts the GR hypothesis that reform deepens and market mechanisms improve 
over time. 
5 Conclusions 
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That reforms should be gradual and incremental is an influential idea in transitional 
economics. China is often held up as an exemplary country that has implemented a GR 
model successfully. In this paper, we set out to test this conjecture. Specifically, we 
examine whether rural income is increasingly determined by market factors such as 
production inputs and resource endowments over time, as a GR strategy predicts. 
Empirical evidence revealed through a rich and detailed household dataset from 1986 to 
2002 provides little support for the GR hypothesis in relation to rural China. While 
economic factors were the main determinants of income growth in the 1980s, political 
and endowment factors (such as collateral) became dominant in the 1990s.  
We explicitly note three caveats in interpreting our findings. First, other than 
looking briefly at credit allocation, we do not offer a rigorous explanation of why 
income determination becomes less market-oriented in the 1990s than in the 1980s. We 
limit our analyses to this dimension because credit is a key driver for income and Qian 
and Huang (2016) have adjudicated among a host of explanations of why financial 
reversals occurred and financing is a key driver for growth. This study provides 
evidence of how inefficiency in credit allocation have impacted income growth. 
Second, our findings should not be interpreted as a critique of the logic of the GR 
model itself. Our empirical tests shed light on whether or not China implemented a GR 
strategy in its rural economy, not whether or not those features of the GR model, such 
as cognitive economy and political feasibility, are flawed.  
Third, our findings are limited to rural China and should not be extrapolated to the 
country as a whole. That said, it should be noted that, at the time of our data, the rural 
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economy was still a substantial component of the Chinese economy and both the 
relative and absolute size of the rural population was substantial. Other facts such as 
the coincidental timing of the reform reversals and declining household consumption, 
are prima facie evidence of the real economic importance of the dynamics documented 
in this paper.  
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Appendix: Definition of variables  
 
Variable name Definition 
Income growth variables 
Income growth, 
household  
The growth rate of net income in the household (household total revenue 
minus expenses and costs). 
Income growth, 
non-farm 
The growth rate of household’s net income from non-farm activities (revenue 
from non-farm production minus non-farm production costs). 
Per labor income Household net income/# of laborers in the household. 
Per unit non-farm 
income 
Net income from non-farm/labor *days spent on non-farm production. 
Production factor variables  
Days on non-farm 
activities  
Total number of days the family members spent on non-farm activities. 
 
Labor force Total number of household members who are in the labor force. 
Cultivated land The size of the land worked by the household at the beginning of the year. 
Formal loan access A dummy variable that equals one if the household obtains loans from banks 
and rural credit cooperatives (RCCs), zero otherwise. 
Amount of formal loan The amount of the loans obtained from banks and RCCs. 
Informal loan access A dummy variable that equals one if the household obtains loans from 
channels other than banks and RCCs, such as mutual cooperatives or 
individuals; zero otherwise. 
Amount of informal 
loan 
The amount of the loans obtained from channels other than banks and RCCs. 
Control variables 
Interest payment rate Total interest payment divided by total loans.  
Other financial assets 
 
The sum of cash, deposits, treasury and private investment, and claims on 
individual lending.  
Fixed assets investment  Investment during the year of fixed assets for production purposes. 
Durable goods The sum of the numbers of durable goods owned by a household, with the 
number of cars and motorcycles rescaled by 100 and 10, respectively. 
Net income Net household income for the year. 
Net income per capita Net household income over total number of household members. 
Profit from non-farm 
activities 
The household’s marginal profit rate from non-farm activities (profit over 
income). 
Agriculture A dummy variable that equals one if agriculture is the main business of the 
household. 
Remittance The household’s gift income from non-local relatives. 
Subsidized family A dummy variable that equals one if the household is subsidized by the 
government for special hardship.  
Education The education level of the leading family member who is in the labor force.  
Political status A dummy variable that equals one if any of the family members is a 
Communist Party member, military veteran, employee of a state-owned firm, 
or a local official; zero otherwise. 
Inflation index 
 
The rural consumption price index for the year in each province, with the 
index values in 1985 set to 100 for all provinces. 
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Table 1: Distribution of the sample by region and year 
This table describes the sample coverage of the fixed-site rural household survey (FSRHS) from 
six provinces in China. Panels A and B show the distribution of villages and households by year for each 
province and for the full sample from the 1986-91 and 1995-2002 surveys, respectively. As we use the 
same dataset as in Qian and Huang (2016), the table describing the sample coverage is the same.   
 
Panel A: Surveys conducted between 1986 and 1991 
Province # of villages Number of households 
  Total 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Liaoning 12 9,103 2,427 2,097 1,145 1,152 1,146 1,136 
Shandong 14 5,683 969 966 967 978 972 831 
Hubei 16 9,723 1,579 1,653 1,675 1,712 1,484 1,620 
Guangdong 10 5,747 1,047 1,056 909 902 908 925 
Yunnan 5 3,001 478 490 512 496 510 515 
Ganshu 9 1,314 282 282 127 162 159 302 
Total  66 34,571 6,782 6,544 5,335 5,402 5,179 5,329 
 
Panel B: Surveys conducted between 1995 and 2002 
Province # of villages Number of households 
  Total  1995 1996 1997 1999 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Liaoning 13 8,653 747 1,155 1,123 1,158 1,162 1,115 1,098 1,095 
Shandong 16 4,280 609 615 572 476 493 505 505 505 
Hubei 16 6,605 865 862 828 793 822 824 798 813 
Guangdong 14 7,003 753 877 819 955 934 935 879 851 
Yunnan 5 3,769 487 478 457 426 467 492 494 468 
Ganshu 15 2,150 274 248 237 231 244 247 265 404 
Total  79 32,460 3,735 4,235 4,036 4,039 4,122 4,118 4,039 4,136 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
This table summarizes household income, labor participation in non-farm activities, resource 
endowment, demographic, and government relationship for the surveyed household. The statistics in 
Panels A and B are based on the pool of observations (household*year) from the first (1986-1991) and 
second (1995-2002) survey periods, respectively.  
 
Variable Observations Mean  
Standard 
deviation  Min.  Max. 
Panel A: Surveys conducted between 1986 and 1991 
Net household income (yuan) 34,571 3943.3 4,840.95 1 181,000 
      Annualized average growth rate  11.8%    
Net household income per labor (yuan) 34,566 852.31 1,099.32 0.25 106,800 
      Annualized average growth rate  12.2%    
Number of household members 34,562 4.73 1.88 1 19 
Labor in the household 34,571 2.39 1.53 1.00 54 
Household non-farm activities days 34,571 107.66 318.15 0 11,700 
Percentage of non-farm activities days 34,571 0.16 0.25 0 1 
Land owned by the household 18,661 6.26 2.23 0.00 1305 
Fixed assets investment 18,661 2.62 8.64 0.00 16,2701 
Education 34,571 2.32 0.85 0 6 
Political status 34,571 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Subsidized family 34,571 0.00 0.07 0 1 
Agriculture specialty 34,571 0.88 0.33 0 1 
Panel B: Surveys conducted between 1995 and 2002 
Net household income (yuan) 32,458 12,463.17 18,647.64 -394,400 1,032,490 
      Annualized average growth rate  3.8%    
Net household income per capita (yuan) 32,411 2,969.193 41,80.192 -98,600 258,122.5 
      Annualized average growth rate  5.1%    
Number of household members 32,422 4.31 1.66 1 18 
Labor in the household 32,183 2.40 1.49 1.00 47 
Household non-farm activities days 32,458 127.05 367.60 0 30,600 
Percentage of non-farm activities days 32,032 0.17 0.27 0 1 
Land owned by the household 32,458 4.87 2.44 0.00 151 
Fixed assets investment 32,458 1.67 6.53 0.00 999,999 
Education 32,458 2.56 0.78 0 8 
Political status 32,460 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Subsidized family 32,458 1.98 0.21 0 1 
Agriculture specialty 32,460 0.82 0.38 0 1 
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Table 3: Univariate comparison of 1986–1991 and 1995–2002 income growth rates  
In this table, we compare household income growth rate in 1986–1991 with that in 1995–2002, 
using four income measures:  net household income, per labor net income (net household 
income/number of household labor force), net income from non-farm activities, and per unit (labor*day) 
income from non-farm activities. These four income indicators are measured in both nominal and 
deflated terms, producing a total of eight measures. 
 After first computing the year-to-year growth rate of these income measures for each household, 
we then compare the pooled average (mean and median) during the two survey periods. Panel A reports 
the mean income growth rates for the full sample and subsample, as well as t-tests of the mean difference 
between the subsamples. Panel B lists the median income growth rates for the full sample and subsample, 
as well as Wilcoxon statistics for the median difference between subsamples. 
 Nominal income Deflated income 
Yearly 
growth 
 rate (%) Household 
Non-farming 
activities 
Household 
income 
Non-farming 
activities 
 Net Per labor Net 
Per labor 
*day Net Per labor Net 
Per labor 
*day 
Mean test 
       Full sample 23.02 22.77 71.99 32.25 13.76 13.64 58.52 22.86 
1986-1991 28.10 27.57 99.78 42.43 14.58 14.16 78.93 27.74 
1995-2002 18.01 18.02 43.73 21.89 12.97 13.13 37.76 17.88 
Difference -10.08 -9.55 -56.05 -20.54 -1.61 -1.03 -41.17 -9.86 
t-statistics [-16.59] [-16.18] [-12.70] [-8.77] [-3.04] [-1.99] [-10.33] [-4.60] 
Median tests 
       Full sample 6.73 6.46 0.00 0.00 1.21 0.87 -4.19 -4.40 
1986-1991 12.14 11.59 4.40 3.38 1.13 0.63 -5.81 -6.61 
1995-2002 2.44 2.34 -0.97 -1.07 1.25 1.06 -3.46 -3.10 
Difference -9.70 -9.24 -5.37 -4.45 0.11 0.44 2.34 3.52 
z-score [-22.14] [-20.53] [-10.27] [-7.94] [0.45] [0.44] [-4.14] [-0.76] 
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Table 4: Household income growth rate by production inputs and resource endowments   
In this table, we compare the income growth rate across household groups by their 
entrepreneurial activities, resource endowment, production inputs, demographic and government 
relationship. The income growth rate uses the deflated net household income annual growth rate. Land 
ownership is classified as low if the household own less than the sample average minus standard 
deviation, and is classified as high if the household own more the sample average plus one standard 
deviation. The same applies for labor force, and days on non-farm. Fixed assets investment is classified as low 
if the household made no fixed assets investment in the year, otherwise it is classified as high. Education 
is classified as low if the scale is below or equal to 2, and high if the scale is 4 or above.  
We conduct the difference test between high versus low groups in each of the time periods 1986–-
1991 and 1995-2005, the difference test between the two time periods for each high or low group, and the 
difference-in-difference test. The number presented is the mean (or DD of mean). The numbers in the 
brackets are t-values. ** denote significance at the 1% level.  
Factors  1986–1991 1995–2002 t-stats of difference /DD 
Low land ownership 22.20 12.58 [5.30] 
High land ownership 27.86 14.98 [5.58] 
t-stats of difference [-2.02] [-1.72] DD=-3.26** 
Low labor force 10.45 6.08 [1.67] 
High land force 26.91 15.61 [7.16] 
t-stats of difference [-5.92] [-6.03] DD=-6.93** 
Low non-farm input 15.56 11.90 [3.98] 
High non-farm  input 30.85 16.36 [8.64] 
t-stats of difference [-8.55] [-4.99] DD=-10.83** 
Low fixed assets investment 19.80 12.11 [10.23] 
High fixed assets investment 26.96 24.11 [1.27] 
t-stats of difference [-4.31] [-8.56] DD=4.84** 
Low education 22.84 11.46 [12.00] 
High education 18.80 12.84 [2.76] 
t-stats of difference [1.65] [-1.15] DD=5.42** 
Political connection—No 21.76 12.85 [11.07] 
Political connection—Yes 19.14 13.38 [4.01] 
t-stats of difference [1.65] [-0.58] DD=3.15** 
Subsidiary—No 21.18 22.57 [-0.30] 
Subsidiary—Yes 21.40 12.88 [0.45] 
t-stats of difference [-0.01] [2.45] DD=-9.11** 
Agriculture specialty—No 26.95 13.11 [7.22] 
Agriculture specialty—Yes 20.37 12.93 [9.83] 
t-stats of difference [3.29] [0.18] DD=6.40** 
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Table 5: Income growth in 1986–1991 
This table reports the results for the determinants of household and labor income growth rate in 
1986–1991. The dependent variables are the growth rate of net household income and household income 
from non-farm activities, measured in both nominal and deflated terms and at both the household and 
per labor and day unit levels. The independent variables include access to finance (bank/RCC loan and 
informal loan access), entrepreneurship (portion of year spent on non-farm activities), household inputs 
(land, household labor forces), household characteristics (education level, subsidized family, agricultural 
specialty), and the non-economic factor of political status. The year and region fixed effects are controlled 
for. Estimation of standard errors are clustered at the household level and presented in the brackets 
below the coefficient. ** and * denotes significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 Nominal income Deflated income 
Year Household 
Non-farming 
activities Household income 
Non-farming 
activities 
 Net Per labor Net 
Per labor 
*day Net Per labor Net 
Per labor 
*day 
Bank RCC 4.50** 3.10* 1.62 -0.70 3.49* 2.06 0.62 4.50** 
     loan access [1.58] [1.50] [12.38] [6.38] [1.37] [1.29] [11.05] [1.58] 
Portion  of year  3.42** 2.67** 12.22** -6.44** 2.55** 2.20** 10.87** 3.42** 
on non-farm [1.07] [0.80] [3.86] [1.22] [0.86] [0.68] [3.43] [1.07] 
Log (informal  0.02 0.16 -0.88 0.66 0.05 0.14 -0.71 0.02 
     loan) [0.19] [0.18] [1.38] [0.71] [0.16] [0.16] [1.23] [0.19] 
Log (cultivated -0.61 1.34 15.81** -1.00 -0.3 1.46* 16.56** -0.61 
     land) [0.79] [0.74] [5.97] [3.20] [0.68] [0.65] [5.48] [0.79] 
Log labor 9.05** -22.74** 1.05 2.33 7.82** -19.93** 2.87 9.05** 
 
[1.20] [1.18] [9.50] [4.56] [1.04] [1.04] [8.48] [1.20] 
Log (fixed assets  1.57** 1.63** 4.92** 3.26** 1.37** 1.36** 4.77** 1.57** 
     investment) [0.23] [0.22] [1.65] [0.80] [0.20] [0.19] [1.51] [0.23] 
Political status -0.91 0.40 -18.83* -1.45 -0.57 0.59 -15.06 -0.91 
 
[1.00] [0.99] [8.50] [4.95] [0.88] [0.87] [7.71] [1.00] 
Education -0.03 -0.41 -7.31 2.28 -0.23 -0.44 -7.95* -0.03 
 
[0.54] [0.52] [4.18] [2.19] [0.47] [0.46] [3.76] [0.54] 
Agricultural  -3.64 -5.39** -10.73 -12.15* -3.69* -5.36** -12.55 -3.64 
     specialty [1.94] [1.78] [11.11] [4.98] [1.67] [1.56] [10.24] [1.94] 
Constant 39.38** 42.49** 117.26** 59.23** 15.25** 31.82** 64.85** 28.98** 
 
[2.71] [2.47] [19.90] [10.33] [2.35] [2.29] [16.43] [9.11] 
Observations 26766 26706 10279 10282 26727 26664 10284 10295 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 
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Table 6: Income growth in 1995–2002 
This table reports the results for the determinants of household and labor income growth rate in 
1995–2002. The dependent variables are the growth rate of net household income and household income 
from non-farm activities, measured in both nominal and deflated terms and at both the household and 
per labor and day unit levels. The independent variables include access to finance (bank/RCC loan and 
informal loan access), entrepreneurship (portion of year spent on non-farm activities), household inputs 
(land, household labor forces), household characteristics (education level, subsidized family, agricultural 
specialty), and the non-economic factor of political status. The year and region fixed effects are controlled 
for. Estimation of standard errors are clustered at the household level and presented in the brackets 
below the coefficient. ** and * denotes significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 Nominal income Deflated income 
Year Household 
Non-farming 
activities Household income 
Non-farming 
activities 
 Net Per labor Net 
Per labor 
*day Net Per labor Net 
Per labor 
*day 
Bank RCC 1.06 0.21 2.12 13.62 2.26 -0.20 1.62 15.1 
     loan access [2.89] [2.84] [17.55] [10.97] [2.64] [2.47] [16.39] [10.08] 
Portion of year 0.90 1.06* 4.11 -3.88** 0.78 1.20* 3.64 -3.72** 
on non-farm [0.54] [0.47] [2.16] [1.23] [0.43] [0.47] [2.01] [1.15] 
Log (informal  0.35 0.33 1.39 0.46 0.23 0.10 1.52 0.25 
     loan) [0.21] [0.21] [1.12] [0.61] [0.18] [0.18] [1.09] [0.58] 
Log (cultivated 0.28 1.74** 9.30* 3.99 -0.20 1.17* 7.82* 2.20 
     land) [0.63] [0.61] [4.16] [2.39] [0.55] [0.54] [3.75] [2.13] 
Log labor 5.16** -15.56** -1.95 0.03 5.81** -14.95** -0.41 -1.41 
 
[1.11] [1.13] [7.16] [4.08] [0.97] [1.01] [6.63] [3.73] 
Log (fixed assets  2.04** 1.84** 2.59 1.03 2.05** 1.68** 2.39 1.15 
     investment) [0.28] [0.27] [1.47] [0.87] [0.26] [0.23] [1.40] [0.79] 
Political status 0.40 2.50* -9.84 -1.21 0.25 2.69** -9.73 -0.14 
 
[1.02] [1.01] [6.91] [4.76] [0.88] [0.90] [6.33] [4.52] 
Education 2.00** 2.09** -6.08 -0.84 1.91** 1.75** -6.15 -0.31 
 
[0.54] [0.54] [3.31] [2.07] [0.47] [0.48] [3.15] [1.91] 
Agricultural  1.23 -0.62 22.34** -1.96 0.41 -0.75 15.39* -1.09 
    specialty [1.29] [1.26] [6.66] [4.08] [1.12] [1.11] [6.08] [3.72] 
Constant 12.21** 17.09** 23.94 19.89* 9.62** 23.12** 15.28 12.89 
 
[2.54] [2.41] [14.44] [8.97] [2.24] [2.24] [13.30] [8.07] 
Observations 27,070 26,956 10,110 10,107 27,108 26,998 10,105 10,094 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
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Table 7: Comparison of income growth determinants between 1986–1991 and 1995–2002 
This table compares the determinants of household and labor income growth rate in 1986–1991 
with those in 1995–2002. The dependent variables are the growth rate of net household income and 
household income from non-farm activities, measured in both nominal and deflated terms and at both 
the household and per labor and day unit levels. 
The independent variables include access to finance (bank/RCC loan and informal loan access), 
entrepreneurship (portion of year spent on non-farm activities), household inputs (land, household labor 
forces), household characteristics (education level, subsidized family, agricultural specialty), and the 
non-economic factor of political status.  
The specification also captures the structural shift between 1986–1991 and 1995–2002 by including 
a dummy (second regime) that equals one if the year falls between 1995 and 2002, together with this 
dummy’s interactive terms with all the stand-alone explanatory variables mentioned above.  
The year and region fixed effects are controlled for. Estimation of standard errors are clustered at 
the household level and presented in the brackets below the coefficient. ** and * denotes significance at 
the 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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  Nominal income Deflated income 
Year Household 
Non-farming 
activities Household income 
Non-farming 
activities 
 Net Per labor Net 
Per labor 
*day Net Per labor Net 
Per labor 
*day 
Stand-alone variables are controlled for 
second regime   -94.91**  -5.34 -8.19** -52.38* -18.23 
   [22.93]  [2.98] [2.98] [20.86] [10.70] 
Interaction of second regime with 
Bank RCC -3.27 -2.43 17.92 18.34 -0.03 -0.90 16.75 20.75 
     loan access [3.24] [3.17] [21.57] [12.74] [2.93] [2.74] [19.90] [11.62] 
Portion of year -2.71* -1.82* -8.03 2.36 -1.88* -1.14 -7.05 1.53 
on non-farm [1.18] [0.92] [4.42] [1.76] [0.95] [0.82] [3.98] [1.63] 
Log (informal  0.47 0.29 2.09 -0.09 0.29 0.05 2.03 -0.13 
     loan) [0.28] [0.28] [1.77] [0.94] [0.24] [0.24] [1.64] [0.86] 
Log (cultivated 0.58 0.53 1.89 7.72* -0.04 0.04 0.3 4.44 
     land) [0.94] [0.90] [6.80] [3.71] [0.81] [0.79] [6.21] [3.41] 
Log labor -4.08** 6.56** 1.08 -2.32 -1.50 4.88** -1.24 -0.7 
 
[1.58] [1.57] [11.39] [5.85] [1.38] [1.40] [10.29] [5.40] 
Log (fixed assets  0.52 0.22 -2.52 -2.21 0.73* 0.33 -2.60 -1.7 
     investment) [0.36] [0.34] [2.22] [1.18] [0.32] [0.30] [2.06] [1.07] 
Political status 1.62 2.33 10.97 1.18 1.18 2.36 7.21 3.07 
 
[1.42] [1.41] [10.93] [6.86] [1.24] [1.25] [9.96] [6.33] 
Education 1.84* 2.42** -1.38 -3.79 1.80** 1.95** -0.08 -2.55 
 
[0.74] [0.73] [5.28] [2.93] [0.65] [0.65] [4.88] [2.67] 
Agricultural  6.18** 5.43* 33.50** 12.69* 5.33** 5.09** 29.36** 12.18* 
     specialty [2.27] [2.12] [12.39] [6.15] [1.96] [1.87] [11.37] [5.55] 
Constant 19.86** 24.16** 118.14** 8.73 16.14** 31.49** 75.97** 29.37** 
 
[2.47] [2.38] [18.96] [8.27] [2.19] [2.21] [16.78] [8.66] 
Observations 53,836 53,662 20,389 20,389 53,835 53,662 20,389 20,389 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 
* and ** denote a 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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 Figure 1: Income growth (annual, %) pattern over the years 
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